Game theory model · 5 Jun 2026 · public-safe brief

The election is close. The post-election game depends on margin.

Derivado de the Central Electoral INFRATEK marco técnico. The model favors Fujimori at 62%, but the strategic risk lives in narrow margins and disputed incentives.

P(Fujimori)62%

P(Sanchez)38%

Median Fujimori~52%

Clear margin > 3pp45%

Crisis margin < 1pp15%

Sanchez > 3pp8%

Core game read

The 1-3 point band is the dangerous equilibrium: close enough to contest, wide enough to survive challenge, and valuable enough for political positioning.

Undecided allocation scenarios

Scenario	Split	Fujimori	Sanchez	Margin	Weight
A, Strong Fujimori	70/30	53.6%	46.4%	+7.2	15%
B, Lean Fujimori	60/40	52.2%	47.8%	+4.4	30%
C, Even split	50/50	50.9%	49.1%	+1.8	25%
D, Lean Sanchez	40/60	49.5%	50.5%	-1.0	20%
E, Strong Sanchez	30/70	48.2%	51.8%	-3.6	10%

Post-electoral paths

> 3 points

Concession pressure dominates. Legal challenge has low expected value.

1-3 points

Selective challenges become rational for positioning, not necessarily reversal.

< 1 point

Highest dispute risk. Timeline can stretch while institutions adjudicate.

Publication rule

This is a probabilistic model, not an official result. ONPE/JNE, observers and reproducible acta-level evidence replace pre-election inference once available.